Corriere della Sera of 21 August 19 8 1 , p. The American aircraft were participating in a routine naval exercise by United States Navy forces in international waters. In accordance with standard international practice, this exercise had been announced on 12 and 14 August through notices to airmen and mariners. In ac- cordance with these notifications the exercises which began on 1 8 August will conclude at The Government of the United States views this unprovoked attack with grave concern.
Any future attack against the United States forces operating in international waters and airspace will also be resisted with force if necessary" Reported in Keesing's, 13 November 19 8 1 , p.
Libya rejected the American protest immediately. Later in the same year the Italian corvette Di Cristofaro, while engaged in a surveillance mission near a fleet of fishing boats, was attacked by Libyan Mirages at a distance of 33 miles from the coast. The latter established an absolute prohibition with regard to firing against foreign vessels with the intention to sink them even if this occurs in the course of a law enforcement operation in waters subject to national jurisdiction.
II3 ff. The F 14 is described as the most advanced combat aircraft in the world, with a speed twice that of sound and a capacity for shooting six of its 14 missiles at the same time while keeping track of 24 targets simultaneously.
The United States on its part signed an agreement with Canada on 29 March on the basis of which the question of delimiting the lateral boundaries of the gulf of Maine was referred to the International Court of Justice. Although at the time of the writing of this paper d lis agreement was not implemented, it is quite likely that the question will be referred to a chamber of the Court without further delay. Reference Works. Primary source collections. Open Access Content. Contact us. Sales contacts.
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View Expanded. View Table. View Full Size. Corporate Social Responsibility. Mission Statement. Corporate Governance. Stay Updated. Rights and Permissions. The internationally recognised government in Tripoli remains disengaged and lacks influence in the Fezzan. The EU, most EU member states, and international organisations have at best a limited presence on the ground; only Italy is trying to implement a stabilisation plan for the south.
State authorities in Tripoli historically have enjoyed less direct influence in the Fezzan than elsewhere in the country. Yet their presence has never been as marginal as today. Hide Footnote As recently as April , representatives of both Ghwell and Haftar — but not Serraj — were present in the town of Murzuq, for example.
A local resident explained:. Murzuq has two heads of police, one appointed by the Ghwell government a Tebu and the other by Haftar and the eastern government a Fezzana. Both operate from the mudiriya police station , and have offices side by side. They each give their orders to the police force.
But the police force is actually the same — so de facto these men are taking orders from two heads of police. There is nobody appointed by the Presidency Council here, in the whole of Murzuq. Apparently, the elected mayor of Murzuq sits in Tripoli. GNA supporters acknowledge their lack of influence in the south, which the Presidency Council attributes to its inability to access and dispose of funds for southern institutions. The Presidency Council also lost ground militarily.
This has given LNA-aligned military groups the upper hand, at least for now. The boats operate in international waters off the coast of Libya, gathering information, rescuing migrants and refugees and destroying boats used by smugglers. On 20 June , the Council reinforced the mandate, adding training for the Libyan coastguard and navy and helping implement the UN arms embargo.
On 25 July , it extended the mandate until 31 December While it has succeeded in its rescue mission, the operation has not reduced the overall flow of migrants using the Central Mediterranean route or the number of deaths at sea, which rose from 2, in to 4, in and stood at more than 2, halfway through On 26 July , Prime Minister Faiez Serraj submitted an official request for the deployment of Italian vessels in Libyan territorial waters to assist the Libyan government with anti-smuggling operations.
One is the limited capacity of the Libyan coastguard, some elements of which are suspected of colluding with smugglers. Migrants are brought to Italy when they are rescued by an international vessel.
Once there, they are rarely repatriated and never returned to Libya. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli, April Hide Footnote Efforts to stop people from entering Libya through Niger also have fallen short of expectations. Despite EU support for authorities in Niger and a government-led crackdown on smugglers in Agadez in , which briefly reduced entries, by mid the number of migrants entering Libya via the Niger border rose again.
By late , security officers in Niger had seized 95 vehicles and arrested smugglers as well as nine police officers for migration-related corruption. This apparently disrupted smuggling networks somewhat in Agadez, forcing them to operate more clandestinely. Crisis Group interview, Murzuq, 31 March German-Italian talks about a military mission appear to focus on the Niger side of the Libyan border. But they do not know where to begin. For the past several years, most international organisations and Western countries have eschewed work in southern Libya.
The UN Support Mission in Libya UNSMIL team, the EU delegation to Libya and most embassies all of which had moved from Tripoli to Tunis by early admitted they barely followed dynamics in the south, focusing instead on the national political crisis and the east-west military divide. There were practical reasons for not engaging with the south.
The closure of Sebha airport for many months in a row, the volatile security landscape and the closure of most hotels since early , all made it difficult to even visit the area. Hide Footnote The exceptions are the French military which was interested in southern Libya as part of Operation Barkhane and neighbouring states — Egypt, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Algeria and Tunisia — that need to secure their borders and monitor the flow of people and fighters.
As mentioned, Qatar was also involved in mediating peace talks in the Obari conflict. Hide Footnote EU officials said additional funds could be earmarked for such projects, though Libyans are sceptical.
Crisis Group interview, Brussels, June Hide Footnote Many questioned whether the UN agencies that will receive these funds can do much in the south. A Libyan diplomat said:. They allocated these funds without asking themselves what they can do.
There is a simple problem of access: how are these organisations going to roll out their projects in the south if they lack implementation capability and access?
Difficulties operating in the Fezzan will continue to be a key impediment. The UN Development Programme UNDP has local staff in Obari and Sebha, working on the rehabilitation of local hospitals, schools and sanitation, but this appears to be more the exception than the rule.
Hide Footnote Several international NGOs engage in reconciliation projects in the south yet these initiatives tend to occur outside of Libya. A number of UN agencies are trying to implement development projects across southern Libya but they operate mainly through local partners or the Libyan Red Crescent. For a complete list of local civil society organisations, see Mixed Migration Trends in Libya , op.
Hide Footnote Most foreign NGOs that were considering starting operations in Sebha gave up because of security concerns.
Hide Footnote Even the International Organization for Migration IOM , which has a presence in Sebha, has had trouble operating since it likened the treatment of migrants there to the slave trade. People here got furious and threatened to kick out their staff. Another challenge for the IOM is the fact that there are no voluntary repatriation flights of illegal migrants from southern Libya. They depart only from Tripoli. Despite these constraints, Italy, which is eager to become more active in the Fezzan, is promoting its own stabilisation project.
The measures proposed are supposed to form the basis for discussions on immediate action to support Italy and reduce flows of migrants. Press release , European Commission, 4 July Many expressed doubts about the project, however. Hide Footnote Questions likewise surround the proposed industrial projects, which include glass and marble factories, whose products will be difficult to market in the sparsely populated south and hard to deliver to wider markets further north because of insecurity on the roads.
We are the only one doing anything. Initiatives to end the tribal wars that have killed thousands in the Fezzan over the past five years have failed thus far to build a solid peace. Despite ongoing ceasefire arrangements and dialogue between groups once at war, lingering tensions remain, some deepened by these very efforts to end the fighting.
Given uncertainty over what Qatar will do — particularly given its isolation from other powers seeking to project influence in Libya, especially Egypt and the United Arab Emirates — expectations need to be adjusted in subsequent negotiations. Efforts still underway, such as negotiations between the Tebu and the Awlad Suleiman, should avoid empty promises. Narrow, local talks among tribal representatives and civil society activists are not enough.
These should be accompanied by negotiations specifically aimed first at bringing together military commanders and leaders of armed groups operating in the south and then integrated into a wider national security dialogue. Stabilisation of the south will depend largely on the outcome of competition between military groups nominally aligned to the internationally recognised government in Tripoli and those belonging to the military coalition under General Haftar.
Crisis Group previously urged a national dialogue to address this rift, but it has yet to materialise. Instead, conversations on security so far have focused on creation of a secure zone in and around Tripoli. This is vital but insufficient; it will do little for the rest of the country, including the south. Restoring an effective, integrated national army with a clear chain of command is crucial both nationally and in the south, where Arab, Tebu and Tuareg officers all aspire to positions of influence.
Ordinary citizens, meanwhile, crave a legitimate armed force that can impose a modicum of order. Beyond the military, other security functions — ordinary policing, securing oil and gas facilities, border guards, etc. UNSMIL, pursuant to its mandate, should take the lead in constructing and conducting this security dialogue and ensuring inclusion of the south and of its concerns.
As a preliminary step, and as it prepares to return to a permanent presence in Libya after a prolonged absence, UNSMIL should deploy to the area.
The different political and strategic agendas that drive various European countries also need greater coordination. Today, France and Italy have taken the most active approach toward the south, each motivated by separate and at times competing priorities.
Rome has energy interests in Libya including in the natural gas extracted in the south and is concerned primarily about the flow of migrants that land on its shores. The two countries have lent political and at times military backing to rival sides in the Libyan conflict with France giving LNA forces covert military support in even as they both nominally support the UN-led diplomatic process.
Europe as a whole is motivated by the migration question, and often appears to be seeking the kind of partnerships it has implemented with countries such as Turkey, designed to prevent refugees and migrants from reaching the continent. In Libya, this is not feasible: the internationally recognised government has little implementing capability, especially in the Fezzan, where forces opposed to the Tripoli government have the upper hand.
At the same time, Europe should provide greater support to UN efforts to resolve the Libyan conflict, stabilise the national economy and create a negotiation track for armed actors aimed at creating a more integrated security sector. Without security, it will be hard to build the economy; without economic alternatives, it will be difficult to curb trafficking, including of migrants; and as long as trafficking continues, Fezzan residents will have incentives to resist efforts to impose security.
This vicious cycle has left European officials both seized with the urgency of reducing migrant flows on the Central Mediterranean route and deeply pessimistic that anything meaningful can be done. That pessimism has stymied even modest, but useful initial steps. In the long term, an end to the Libyan conflict would create opportunities that will lure many back into the licit economy while absorbing migrant labour from sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere, as was the case before Libya has massive potential wealth and a long backlog of major infrastructure and reconstruction projects.
In the short to medium term, even as the conflict endures, some measures are both possible and advisable:. The agricultural sector is especially worth exploring: farming is not highly reliant on high-tech equipment, which is difficult to maintain and secure, and it can quickly bring food and employment to the local population. As Crisis Group observed in the south, privately owned and secured farms have continued to function, even amid the current disorder, because owners have a stake in protecting them.
In contrast, low paid employees fled the now largely defunct state-owned farms when conditions deteriorated. Further studies are necessary to determine whether the better solution would be privatisation, cooperative ownership structures or another form of collective organisation.
In the meantime, the EU and others should encourage and, if necessary, help the UN-recognised government to improve its agricultural sector, which also would enhance its standing among the Libyan people. Second, UN agencies, in coordination with the internationally recognised government and local municipal authorities should seek to reopen Sebha airport, facilitate negotiations among local security factions to secure it and carry out the minor infrastructural work necessary to enable commercial flights to Obari.
Third, national and international oil companies — notably around Murzuq and Obari, the two locations where they have facilities — should implement small-scale development projects in cooperation with local civil society. According to Libyan law, oil companies are supposed to invest in communities and promote social development projects, but they do not.
Legal obligations aside, it would be smart business to lower community resentment. The NOC should deliver on its promises to avoid new problems and it should reach out to other communities in oil-rich areas. Maintaining good relations with civil society groups is all the more important in the current atmosphere of insecurity, where a single militia leader can block production in hopes of a pay-off.
When a community has an interest in ensuring that does not happen it can pressure local militias to back off. The UN-brokered peace process in Libya has stalled, leaving unresolved pressing issues like worsening living conditions, control of oil facilities, people-smuggling, and the struggle against jihadist groups. New negotiations are needed to engage key actors who have been excluded so far.
The December Libyan Political Agreement, signed in Skhirat, Morocco, has reconfigured more than contributed to resolving internal strife. A year ago, the conflict was between rival parliaments and their associated governments; today it is mainly between accord supporters and opponents, each with defectors from the original camps and heavily armed.
New negotiations involving especially key security actors not at Skhirat are needed to give a unity government more balanced underpinning.
Skhirat sought to resolve the dispute between the House of Representatives HoR and its associated government, based respectively in the eastern cities of Tobruk and al-Bayda, and the General National Congress GNC and its government in Tripoli.
It created a Presidency Council, a rump executive that took office in Tripoli in March and was tasked to form a unity government, and an advisory High State Council of ex-GNC members. The HoR was to continue as the sole parliament and approve the unity government, but it has yet to do so. The institutional set-up thus is incomplete, leading to a skewed result, while supporters and foes cling to technical legalities to buttress their positions.
Military actors seek leverage by faits accomplis aimed at improving their negotiating positions and imposing themselves within their own camp. Over this period, a coalition of western Libyan militias operating nominally under the Presidency Council and with U. The aggregate effect is that divisions have deepened. That the Presidency Council, as interim executive, has made little progress on everyday issues such as the cash liquidity crisis and water and electricity shortages further undermines confidence.
External actors who pushed for diplomacy and made much of their support for Skhirat are almost as divided as Libyans. A group of mostly Western countries, led by the U.
Prioritising the fight against IS and controlling migrant and refugee flows, it favours moving ahead on the Skhirat roadmap without the HoR if necessary, betting that if governance can be improved in the west first, the east may eventually join.
It has given Haftar overt and covert political and military support, as has France on counter-terrorism grounds. Longer term, a failed peace process and escalating clashes would give radical groups opportunity to regroup.
The immediate priority thus is to avoid the violence that seems to be brewing in the Gulf of Sirte, Benghazi and perhaps Tripoli. Avoiding a new confrontation in the oil crescent is particularly urgent, combined with an agreement that the forces there allow the National Oil Corporation to repair damaged facilities and resume exports, as Libyan law and UN resolutions demand. Beyond this, a reset of the mired peace process is imperative. The attempt to implement Skhirat without HoR approval and excluding Haftar should end; likewise, backers must press Haftar to negotiate.
Both sides need to make concessions, especially on security. The Presidency Council should do more to reassure the east it works for all, not just the west, and resume unity government talks with the HoR. Little progress will be made without involving the most important armed actors in dialogue. Compromise on the command structure and their relationship with the Presidency Council is a necessary precursor to tackling wider disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration.
The prospect of Libya in freefall should give all pause, especially the vulnerable neighbours. Regional and global actors involved in the diplomatic process over Libya should converge on common goals, push for a renegotiation of the accord, use their influence to restrain the belligerents and nudge them toward a political solution and participation in a security track.
As the situation has taken increasingly alarming turns, outside actors — some, like France, long involved; others, like Saudi Arabia, newly active — are seeking to revive, the Skhirat process in one form or another. Understanding what went wrong, might be corrected and is necessary to do so is the best hope to salvage an agreement. This changed the political balance to the detriment of the largely Islamist, revolutionary political coalition dominant in the GNC. The HoR and international community did not accept the ruling, so the HoR remained the internationally-recognised parliament.
As a result, Libya had rival parliaments and governments with limited territorial control and authority over armed groups. A legitimate, sovereign government could restart oil production and export, right the economy, begin demobilising and reintegrating armed groups and call on the international community to root the Islamic State IS out of Sirte.
The driver of the talks was the Libyan Political Dialogue, which included representatives of the two rival parliaments in existence since , the House of Representatives HoR, based in Tobruk and the General National Congress GNC, based in Tripoli , joined later by various independent personalities.
By the end of , while much progress had been made on general principles, the outcome was quite different from the plan. Hide Footnote When, after nearly a year of negotiations, the outcome appeared imperilled, many external advocates thought it better to press ahead, calculating naysayers could be brought in later. The timing of the agreement, signed on 17 December , appeared premature and to lack a sufficiently broad consensus to be sustainable.
This undermines the ultimate goal of territorial integrity under a unity government that, by improving the political, economic and security situation, can lay the foundation for a more stable, inclusive order.
It also suggests how to rejigger the process to achieve a more durable outcome. It consists of a preamble and 67 articles, additional provisions fifteen articles and six annexes. Faiez al-Serraj, a relatively unknown HoR member from Tripoli, became council president on signature.
His name had not circulated before, and he was not one of the twelve candidates shortlisted by the HoR.
Nonetheless, Serraj had the advantage of being uncontroversial. Crisis Group interview, Tripoli-based politician, Tripoli, November Hide Footnote Serraj was to become prime minister once the HoR ratified the accord and approved a cabinet that the council had 30 days to present and the HoR ten days to approve.
The new government would then govern for a renewable one-year period. The governments linked to the post parliaments would be dissolved, and the HoR would stay as the legitimate parliament, while most members of the Tripoli-based GNC would be integrated into the consultative High State Council, a new body with a say in appointing top state posts.
The council president and deputies must unanimously agree on a new army commander and head of intelligence the latter requiring HoR approval and appointment and dismissal of ambassadors proposed by the foreign minister , declaring a state of emergency, war and peace and adoption of exceptional measures upon approval by a National Defence and Security Council and HoR endorsement.
Libyan Political Agreement. To be integrated into state security forces, armed forces would need to recognise the unity government and lay down weapons. Supporters in Libya and abroad said the accord was backed by majorities of both parliaments and ordinary citizens. The latter was broadly true. Most Libyans were fed up with the long divide, the fighting and economic and financial toll and welcomed a settlement in principle.
But the same cannot be said of the parliaments. Ministerial meeting for Libya Joint communique , Rome, 13 December Secretary of State John Kerry reiterated that assumption in a televised statement that day. Numerous Libyans of different political, geographical and tribal affiliations suggested overwhelming support for a negotiated compromise to end the conflict. Hide Footnote A substantial HoR majority opposed the military and security provisions; many also contested enlarging the council from three to nine and individual nominations to it.
There were no clear selection guidelines, but many HoR members asserted a tacit understanding that the HoR and GNC would each choose a deputy, and the president would be a consensus figure from an HoR shortlist. The three would represent the western, eastern and southern regions and main political factions.
To accommodate other political and geographic constituencies, the UN and dialogue members changed this in December to a president, five deputies and three ministers of state. HoR members called for changes to the security arrangements a number of times. In November and December, 92 of who supported the accord did so in what was known as the Fezzan Initiative.
On 25 January , 89 expressed such reservations in a preliminary vote on the agreement. In retrospect, proponents inflated support for the accord within the rival legislatures to justify going forward. Misrepresentations also coloured the debate over subsequent failures to obtain a formal HoR endorsement. Accord backers have repeatedly claimed the HoR president prevented a 25 February vote because most members were pro-deal, but that is uncertain: HoR members say pro-endorsement members had inflated the list of supporters, including members who were not in Tobruk on the day.
Hide Footnote The claim of majority backing was factually dubious — many members supported an agreement in principle but differed widely on details — and politically misleading, since key opponents were outside the HoR and the GNC and had military power to intimidate supporters, including several armed groups in western Libya and important forces affiliated with Haftar and the self-proclaimed Libyan National Army, mainly in the east.
In eastern Libya, there are frequent reports of Haftar-allied security services arbitrarily detaining pro-council political activists and social-media commentators. By end of , mounting anxiety among Libyan participants of the UN-mediated dialogue and their international backers about the state of negotiations and the deteriorating economic and security situation heightened pressures to sign the accord even with key issues unresolved. The main international backers were well aware of the limited progress, incompatibility of demands and popular disaffection, but they, including incoming UN envoy Kobler, felt they were out of time, and the process might collapse.
The most engaged Security Council permanent members — the U. Even states sceptical of implementation, such as Russia and Egypt, urged that the deal go forward. Crisis Group interview, Brussels, December IS threats to hit Rome from Libya led Italy to push harder. Two days before a conference where internationals backed the agreement, Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed scepticism about the power-sharing aspect, but said Russia would support it.
Comments at RomeMed conference, Rome, 11 December He resigned shortly thereafter. Political Dialogue participants indicated they also wanted the accord signed. Crisis Group interview, Tunis, March In March , the GNC and HoR delegations presented an alternative draft accord containing their revisions, but their initiative appears to have faltered.
Hide Footnote Their main concern was that the situation would fester, factions would fragment further and the most intransigent political actors would drown out more moderate voices.
Hide Footnote They also assumed opponents might join once they saw the level of support, and they brushed aside concerns over a possible backlash from rushing a deal without bringing along important constituencies and key military actors. Several other factors contributed to a perception a deal was needed fast. A related fear was that if the opportunity to attack IS was not seized, international attention would move on, anti-IS operations would refocus on Syria and Iraq, and the momentum to act in Libya would be lost.
In early , U. Hide Footnote Explaining the rationale for moving forward with the Skhirat agreement, a senior U. In six months all three Libyan governments will have ceased to exist, and the only one left will be the government of Daesh [IS]. By implementing the political accord and moving the Presidency Council to Tripoli, we might have a chance to change dynamics and improve the fight against Daesh, which is consolidating its grip in the country.
A subsequent step would expand operations into Libyan territorial waters. Hide Footnote By late October , the UN Security Council had authorised operations in international but not territorial waters, and the Presidency Council had not requested the latter. The regional environment was another concern. Some Western backers of the UN process feared that without a quick agreement, regional actors such as the UAE and Egypt, which were nominally supportive but sceptical of the deal and continuing to back its opponents, would get their way.
A Western official said:. Not signing and endorsing the accord would have been a major defeat for those like us who had been advocating a negotiated power-sharing deal as the only solution to the Libya crisis.
It would have meant a failure of the principle of negotiations, and that would have allowed those governments that throughout had advocated direct unilateral action in support of the HoR and its government to declare victory. In a certain sense he was our choice. Crisis Group interview, Amsterdam, May A corollary was fear Western countries such as France and the U. Most notably the U. Though these were all valid concerns, particularly for nearby countries threatened by IS and other jihadist groups and Europe, where the refugee crisis had become a political and policy priority, they have not been sufficient priorities to convince Libyan military actors to rally behind the accord and the Presidency Council.
After being in denial for much of , Libyans were concerned with IS growth, particularly as it began increasingly deadly attacks outside Sirte and threatened to expand eastward toward critical oil facilities. That month IS adherents also attacked checkpoints around Sidra and Ras Lanuf, east of Sirte, where key crude-oil export terminals are. Hide Footnote But, several important military factions remained at loggerheads, displaying little interest in collaborating against IS.
In June , forces from western Libya launched Operation al-Bunyan al-Marsus The Impenetrable Edifice against IS in Sirte, but they were mainly volunteers from Misrata joined by a few from other western and southern cities.
Most officers from Sirte aligned with Haftar and did not join the Bunyan Marsus operation. Crisis Group interview, Col. Ramadan Ahmed, Misrata, 8 June Other politicians and diplomats say that about half those fighting in Sirte are not under the council. A major flaw of the strategy to create facts on the ground by recognising a unity government was that it was difficult to see how international goals — countering IS and stemming the refugee flow through Libya — could be sustainable without improved governance and a genuine broad agreement on state institutions and the military.
Crisis Group interview, Rome, September Crisis Group interview, Brussels, 7 December The gap between its supporters and foes increased and triggered military mobilisations, while international fractures reasserted themselves. The Tripoli-based heads of the Central Bank and National Oil Corporation, key institutions for the viability of any unity government, were also on board.
Hide Footnote More generally, there was broad support among ordinary people in the west for any deal that produced a more effective government that would end division and violence. There is no money; the country is fragmented. Hide Footnote International supporters treated the west as more immediately important, because of the necessity of establishing a government in Tripoli, the capital.
Hide Footnote Each had often opportunistic reasons to oppose either the agreement or council line-up. Jibril considered the power-sharing set-up unworkable. Crisis Group interview, Rome, January This current is best represented by ex-Defence Minister Osama Jwehli, who has stated he is open to a revised agreement if dominance of Misratan and Islamist militias in Tripoli is addressed satisfactorily.
Crisis Group interview, Zintan, June Another faction, led by army commander Col. A Zintani representative, Omar al-Aswad, was appointed to the council but suspended participation in February to protest its cabinet nominations. Hide Footnote Islamists of various stripes opposed the council initially as foreign-picked. His televised speech, Tanasukh channel, 31 March It is taking firm positions and telling people they have to accept these.
Crisis Group telephone interview, March So at some point we have to take the decisions for them and persuade them to follow. Crisis Group interview, Western diplomat, March Despite opposition from these groups and the GNC leadership, the UN and several foreign capitals felt there was enough militia and political leader support in the west to proceed.
The president of the Presidency Council, Faiez al-Serraj, surprised many when, on 30 March, he and six other council members arrived in Tripoli from Tunisia aboard a Libyan navy frigate and set up operations inside the naval base. Many western municipalities were also quick to recognise council authority, as did the main financial institutions in Tripoli. Addressing more immediate problems, such as the liquidity crisis and freezing of letters of credit, was also a priority to boost support for the new authorities.
He later denied this, and continued to run a rump cabinet in the capital and in October again declared himself in power. He subsequently said he had not authored that statement and denied he had resigned. Crisis Group telephone interview, official close to Ghwell, Tripoli, 15 March On 14 October , local forces hitherto loyal to the Presidency Council switched sides and declared backing for Ghwell and ex-GNC members as the legitimate authorities.
Crisis Group interviews, politicians, security officers, Tripoli, October Hide Footnote That the arrival in Tripoli went smoother than expected was in part because it co-opted groups by allowing them to retain influence and financial leverage.
Crisis Group telephone interviews, Tripoli-based members of armed groups and politicians, April-May Hide Footnote This demonstrated the council, once marginal in Tunis, could gain control over key state institutions. Momentum was short-lived, however.
The next day, with 53 votes, they elected Swehli its president. The accord is like a seed: it needs to be cared for and nurtured. Crisis Group telephone interview, Misratan politician, 8 May The risk of open confrontation was real on multiple fronts.
Yet, tensions were rife on other fronts, not least between ex-army officers who hoped the new council would give them senior positions and armed group heads. Crisis Group telephone interviews, ex-army officers, Tripoli, April-May There was also competition over protection for the council. Crisis Group interview, Western analyst, Tripoli, 25 April Crisis Group interviews, foreign security contractor, Rome, 10 April ; Libyan politician in contact with European intelligence agencies, April Several factions filed constitutional or implementation challenges with the court.
Crisis Group telephone interview, April The Supreme Court has yet to rule. In an open letter announcing he was freezing his participation, Aswad accused colleagues of last-minute changes to the proposed line-up, including by increasing the number of ministers, without informing him. In August , after the HoR rejected the proposed GNA line-up, Aswad rejoined the council but Qatrani said he would not as long as it met in Tripoli, because the city was controlled by hostile armed groups.
He did meet other council members in Tunis in September and October. On the eve of a 16 May ministerial in Vienna, Serraj felt confident enough to announce that the unity government would begin functioning that week. Though the HoR had not approved his cabinet, he called on ministers-designate a new group of thirteen ministers plus five ministers of state, in addition to the nine-member Presidency Council to take office. Hide Footnote A handful began to work as de facto ministers, but at least four refused without HoR endorsement.
Only one full cabinet meeting has taken place since, in June. The minister-designate complained that since a first cabinet meeting in June, there has been no direct contact with Serraj. Crisis Group telephone interview, minister-designate who attended the first cabinet meeting, Tripoli, July Several ministries, particularly those outside the downtown and east-central Souq al-Jumaa area, remained controlled by the Ghwell government or anti-council militias.
Initially, only the ministers-designate for foreign affairs, local governance and interior could work in their own buildings. The council itself continued to operate for some months from the naval base.
Souq al-Jumaa is a neighbourhood with many pro-council militias. Crisis Group interviews, minister-designate, security official familiar with armed group occupying the prime ministry, Tripoli, June, October For months, few Serraj-appointed ministers including those who started to meet with foreigners in May controlled their budgets.
Though the council appears to be in charge of approving payments through the Central Bank, it is unclear whether any minister will have long-term access to state funds without HoR endorsement, as under the accord parliament must approve the budget. But at least through July, when the bank gave it 1. A minister-designate travelling to meet foreign officials allegedly complained he did not receive funds for a ticket, while businessmen reportedly bankrolled some council activity.
Crisis Group interview, Misratan businessman, Rome, 15 May For the Central Bank to legally fund ministries, the council must instruct the finance ministry to allocate ministerial budgets, including for salaries.
Senegal is bounded by the Atlantic Ocean to the west, Mauritania to the north, Mali to the east, and Guinea and Guinea-Bissau to the south.
Seychelles officially the Republic of Seychelles is an archipelago nation of islands in the Indian Ocean, some 1, kilometres east of mainland Africa, northeast of the island of Madagascar.
Other nearby island countries and territories include Zanzibar to the west, Mauritius and Reunion to the south, Comoros and Mayotte to the southwest, and the Suvadives of the Maldives to the northeast. It is bordered by Guinea in the northeast, Liberia in the southeast, and the Atlantic Ocean in the southwest. Somalia officially the Somali Republic is a country located in the Horn of Africa. It is bordered by Djibouti to the northwest, Kenya on its southwest, the Gulf of Aden with Yemen on its north, the Indian Ocean at its east, and Ethiopia to the west.
The Republic of South Africa is a country located at the southern tip of the continent of Africa. The South African coast stretches 2, kilometres and borders both the Atlantic and Indian oceans.
South Sudan is a country in eastern Africa. Sudan officially the Republic of Sudan is a country in northeastern Africa. The Kingdom of Swaziland is relatively small in area, similar in size to Kuwait.
Swaziland is a landlocked country, bordered by South Africa on three sides except to the east, where it borders Mozambique. To the east it borders the Indian Ocean. The country extends south to the Gulf of Guinea, on which the capital Lom is located. Tunisia, officially the Tunisian Republic, is a country located in North Africa. It is bordered by Algeria to the west and Libya to the southeast.
It is the northernmost country on the African continent, and the smallest of the nations situated along the Atlas mountain range. Around forty percent of the country is composed of the Sahara desert, with much of the remainder consisting of particularly fertile soil and a km coastline. The Republic of Uganda is a landlocked country in East Africa. It is bordered on the east by Kenya, on the north by Sudan, on the west by the Democratic Republic of the Congo, on the southwest by Rwanda, and on the south by Tanzania.
The southern part of the country includes a substantial portion of Lake Victoria, within which it shares borders with Kenya and Tanzania. The Republic of Zambia is a landlocked country in Southern Africa. The neighbouring countries are the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, Tanzania to the north-east, Malawi to the east, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Namibia to the south, and Angola to the west.
Zimbabwe officially the Republic of Zimbabwe is a landlocked country, located in the southern part of the continent of Africa, between the Zambezi and Limpopo Rivers. It is bordered by South Africa to the south, Botswana to the southwest, Zambia to the northwest, and Mozambique to the east. Sign up for our Newsletter. All rights reserved. Angola Angola officially the Republic of Angola is a country in south-central Africa bordering Namibia to the south, Democratic Republic of the Congo to the north, and Zambia to the east, and with a west coast along the Atlantic Ocean.
Burundi Burundi, officially the Republic of Burundi, is a small country in the Great Lakes region of Eastern Africa bordered by Rwanda to the north, Tanzania to the south and east, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo to the west.
Cameroon The Republic of Cameroon is a unitary republic of central and western Africa. Chad Chad officially known as the Republic of Chad is a landlocked country in central Africa. Comoros The Comoros officially the Union of the Comoros is an island nation in the Indian Ocean, located off the eastern coast of Africa on the northern end of the Mozambique Channel between northern Madagascar and northeastern Mozambique.
Lesotho Lesotho officially the Kingdom of Lesotho is a landlocked country and enclave entirely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa.
Madagascar Madagascar, originally Republic of Madagascar, is an island nation in the Indian Ocean off the southeastern coast of Africa. Malawi The Republic of Malawi is in southern Africa. Mauritania Mauritania, officially the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, is a country in northwest Africa. Mauritius Mauritius officially the Republic of Mauritius is an island nation off the coast of the African continent in the southwest Indian Ocean, about kilometres east of Madagascar.
Mozambique Mozambique, officially the Republic of Mozambique, is a country in southeastern Africa bordered by the Indian Ocean to the east, Tanzania to the north, Malawi and Zambia to the northwest, Zimbabwe to the west and Swaziland and South Africa to the southwest.
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