The second section of this article examines how different theoretical approaches in the field comprehend the concept of hegemony. Here I focus primarily on the two main rival theories of realism and liberalism. I will argue that the fundamental division between, on the one hand, hegemony as overwhelming power and, on the other hand, the exercise of leadership, characterises the different accounts of hegemony provided by realism and liberalism.
After discussing realist and liberal theories of hegemony, I move on to consider how neo-Gramscians, constructivists, and members of the English School grasp the concept of hegemony. In the conclusion, I summarise some of the findings that emerge from a review of the literature.
Here we can already see how the definition of hegemony embodies the twin propositions of overwhelming power capabilities and the exercise of leadership.
In this manner, hegemony involves a relationship between actors, whether it be people or states. This relational aspect of hegemony, as we will see, is important for those who conceptualise hegemony as the exercise of some form of leadership.
This leadership can be consensual or dominating, but the important point is the notion that hegemony entails a relationship between a preponderant state or social group and others. Ian Clark , pp. As we will see in the next section, those who emphasise domination largely associate hegemony with preponderant material capabilities while those who emphasise the leadership dimension argue that this is an insufficient basis for understanding the concept of hegemony.
There is no monolithic theory of realism; instead, there is a diverse family of realist theories Dunne and Schmidt, , pp. Nevertheless, despite some exceptions, realists generally define hegemony in terms of first, overwhelming power, and second, the ability to use this power to dominate others. At the end of the day, however, the predominant tendency among realists is to equate hegemony with overwhelming material power.
Yet simply equating hegemony with a preponderance of power is problematic because power is also a contested term. Here, the hegemon is identified as the state that possesses vastly superior material capabilities including military, economic and, sometimes, diplomatic or soft power. Because realists believe that violent conflict is always a possibility in the anarchical international system, military power is considered the most important foundation of hegemony.
For Posen, the military foundation of US hegemony is deeply entrenched and therefore likely to last for the near future. Closely connected to the notion that hegemony entails the concentration of material capabilities in one state is the related idea that this preponderant state is able to dominate all of the subordinate states Levy and Thompson, With this definition, we can begin to see how hegemony is conceptualised less as an attribute of a single state and more a property of what is termed the international system.
This is clearly apparent in the work of Robert Gilpin, who considers hegemony to be a particular structure that has periodically characterised the international system. Layne, who is a neoclassical realist, posits that there are four features of hegemony. First, and most importantly, is that it entails hard power. Like Mearsheimer, Layne argues that hegemons have the most powerful military. They also possess economic supremacy to support their preeminent military capabilities.
Within the realist literature on hegemony, there is a tendency to conflate hegemony with unipolarity. Unipolar systems are by definition those with only one predominant state. While both multipolar and bipolar systems are typically characterised by active counterbalancing, unipolar systems, according to Wohlforth, do not exhibit any counterbalancing.
In fact, the presence of a unipolar or hegemonic power is an indication that, contrary to realist balance-of-power theory, balancing has actually failed to take place. Those who equate hegemony with unipolarity are basically accentuating the overwhelming material power dimension of the hegemon and ignoring, or discounting, the wilful exercise of leadership component of the concept.
According to this formula, hegemony and unipolarity are basically synonymous with preponderant material power. A state with vastly superior material capabilities is both the hegemon and the unipolar power. Many theorists who do not adhere to realist theory reject this formula. Instead, these theorists make a distinction between hegemony and unipolarity; they are different concepts. According to this conceptualisation, it is certainly possible to have a unipolar system without anyone exercising hegemony.
In this case, there would be a unipolar power that nevertheless fails to exercise any leadership or influence over the subordinate states in the international system Wilkinson, , pp.
The realist variant of hegemonic stability theory does make an attempt to marry the dual components of hegemony; preponderant power and the exercise of leadership. David Lake in fact argues that the theory of hegemonic stability is not a single theory, but a research programme composed of two, analytically distinct theories: leadership theory and hegemony theory , p.
The starting point of hegemonic stability theory is the presence of a single dominant state. In addition to preponderant power, hegemonic stability theory asserts that one of the roles of the hegemon, especially liberal hegemons such as Great Britain in the 19th century and the United States in the later part of the 20th century, is to ensure international order by creating international institutions and norms that facilitate international cooperation.
Hegemonic stability theory is basically a realist prescription of how to achieve international stability in an anarchical international system. The hegemon, according to this theory, provides public goods out of self-interest to achieve an open, liberal economic order. The functioning of a liberal, open economic order is contingent upon the existence of a hegemon who is willing to exercise the necessary leadership to maintain the system. The liberal variant of hegemonic stability theory underscores the importance of a hegemon in establishing a liberal economic order.
When the power of the hegemon begins to erode, hegemonic stability theory predicts that there will be a corresponding weakening of the liberal economic order. This is a point that many liberal critics of hegemonic stability theory contest. Keohane, for example, believes that cooperation and the perpetuation of international regimes are certainly possible once a hegemon inevitably begins to decline. Most liberal theories of hegemony accentuate the particular type of leadership that is exercised by the hegemon.
Liberals do not completely discount the importance of preponderant material power, but they argue that this alone is insufficient for understanding the concept of hegemony. Liberal theorists are, for the most part, interested in the mechanisms and processes through which hegemony is exercised.
This is also the case with other schools of thought including constructivism, neo-Gramscianism, and the English School. Building on the work of James G. March, Keohane defined the basic force model of hegemony as the possession of unrivalled tangible measures of power, and the force activation model as encompassing both abundant power capabilities and the will to exercise leadership.
Keohane dismisses the realist uni-dimensional understanding of hegemony as preponderant material power for the latter force activation model that emphasises both the possession of unrivalled capabilities and the willingness to exercise leadership. By exercising leadership in this manner, hegemony is established less by domination and more by consent.
The latter, for liberals, is a more enduring and robust form of hegemony. This is why Keohane is dismissive of realists who simply equate hegemony with material predominance. This is certainly the view of those who subscribe to liberal conceptions of hegemony. States enter international order out of enlightened self-interest, engaging in self-restraint and binding themselves to agreed-upon rules and institutions.
In essence, a grand bargain is made between the hegemonic state and the secondary states to create a liberal hegemonic order. The latter willingly agree to participate within the order and the dominant state agrees to place limits on the exercise of its power Ikenberry, , p. The power that is exercised by the hegemon is based on the rule of law.
This, in turn, helps to legitimate hegemonic liberal order. For Ikenberry, the maintenance of liberal international order, as well as its legitimacy, is contingent upon the hegemon abiding by the rules and institutions that it helped to create in the first place. In addition to the exercise of hegemonic power via rules and institutions, which is the foundation of liberal hegemonic order, John Ikenberry and Charles Kupchan argue that there are two other ways, besides for outright imperial domination, by which a hegemonic state can exercise power and gain the acquiescence of other states.
They identify this second way as exercising power through socialisation. In this manner, hegemony is achieved more cheaply as other states voluntarily agree to comply with the hegemon on the basis of shared interests and a sense of legitimacy. The neo-Gramscian approach to hegemony also accepts the view that hegemony is about more than just raw material power and domination. Cox combines material power, ideas, and institutions into a comprehensive theory of hegemony.
Drawing directly from the work of Antonio Gramsci, Cox argues that hegemony incorporates two elements: force and consent. Thus for Cox, hegemony cannot be reduced to pure material domination. While conceding that a dominant state is a necessary component of hegemony, Cox, and Marxists more generally, including neo-Gramscians, underline the importance of social forces that are shaped by production relations.
He argues that hegemonic and non-hegemonic forms can exist at each of the three levels. Of the three levels, Cox argues that hegemony at the world order level is most complex because it incorporates both of the other levels.
Dominance alone, Cox argues, is an insufficient basis of hegemony at the world order level. In this sense, it is universalist and not based solely on the parochial interests of a single dominant state. By conceptualising hegemony as a fit between material power, ideas, and institutions, it is difficult, if not impossible, to privilege one set of factors over another. Nevertheless, it is possible to argue that international institutions and the process of institutionalisation are key components of the neo-Gramscian conception of hegemony even while admitting, as Cox does, that hegemony cannot be reduced to the institutional dimension.
In similarity to liberal conceptions of hegemony, Cox argues that international institutions help to mitigate conflict and reduce the necessity of resorting to force.
Crucially, while international institutions embody the material interests of the hegemon, they also, according to Cox, perform an ideological function in that they help to legitimate the norms of world order. By casting its interests as universal, rather than parochial, the hegemon is more likely to get secondary states to acquiesce to the existing order and accept it as legitimate. This is what Gramsci meant by hegemony. By recognising that there is a close connection between institutionalisation and hegemony, Cox underlines the importance of ideology in helping to maintain consent with minimum recourse to force.
As important as institutions are for Cox, he argues that hegemony cannot be reduced to the institutional dimension. Institutions are only one pillar of a hegemonic order and need to be considered together with material capabilities and ideas. By emphasising the role of ideas, and recognising that the social world is composed of both material and ideational forces, social constructivist conceptions of hegemony are not dissimilar to those put forward by Cox and neo-Gramscians.
Constructivists, however, are more inclined to emphasise the ideational aspects of hegemony over the material. Thus it is not just the ideology of elites that matter, but also how dominant ideas percolate downward and become taken for granted by the broader public.
He identifies this as common-sense constructivism, the aim of which it to bring the masses back into world politics. More specifically, the desire for relative gains makes cooperation extremely difficult as a trusting relationship cannot be established between two sovereign nations.
Gramsci on the other hand, believes that states favour absolute gains because it is in the class interest of the dominant group to maximise domestic production. Furthermore, Gramsci distorts the realist use of the word hegemony, which applies almost exclusively to the condition of states in the international arena, in its original sense, to encompass domestically held political control. The concept of hegemony was revolutionised by Antonio Gramsci.
It must also be stated that the contrasting concepts of relative and absolute gains, and their desirability, are marked divergences between the two hegemonic theories.
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